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What is the role and value of pleasure in addiction? Foddy and Savulescu (1) have claimed
that substance use is just pleasure-oriented behavior. They describe addiction as “strong
appetites toward pleasure” and argue that addicts suffer in significant part because of
strong social and moral disapproval of lives dominated by pleasure seeking. But such lives,
they claim, can be autonomous and rational. The view they offer is largely in line with the
choice model and opposed to a disease model of addiction. Foddy and Savulescu are scep-
tical of self-reports that emphasize the ill effects of addiction such as loss of family and
possessions, or that claim an absence of pleasure after tolerance sets in. Such reports they
think are shaped by social stigma which makes available a limited set of socially approved
addiction narratives. We will not question the claim that a life devoted to pleasure can be
autonomously chosen. Nor do we question the claim that the social stigma attached to
the use of certain drugs increases the harm suffered by the user. However our interviews
with addicts (as philosophers rather than health professionals or peers) reveal a genuinely
ambivalent and complex relationship between addiction, value, and pleasure. Our subjects
did not shy away from discussing pleasure and its role in use. But though they usually
valued the pleasurable properties of substances, and this played that did not mean that
they valued an addictive life. Our interviews distinguished changing attitudes towards drug
related pleasures across the course of substance use, including diminishing pleasure from
use over time and increasing resentment at the effects of substance use on other valued
activities. In this paper we consider the implications of what drug users say about pleasure
and value over the course of addiction for models of addiction.
Keywords: addiction, pleasure, autonomy, choice theory, reward and motivation
Well don’t get me wrong, I love using mate. If I could use
successfully I would. I’d still be using. I love using. I just don’t
like the shit that comes with it. (R50)
INTRODUCTION
According to the so-called Moral Model (or Lay View), held by
many, perhaps the majority of ordinary people, drug use by peo-
ple who satisfy standard definitions of addiction is not the product
of a disease or disorder that undermines the autonomy of the user.
Drug use is voluntary behavior motivated by pleasure. The Lay
or Moral Model of addiction takes a stern normative stance on
the seeking of pleasure in this way – it regards it as parasitic,
irresponsible, hedonism.
The minimal Liberal view of addiction expounded by Foddy
and Savulescu (1) rejects the moralism of the Lay view but agrees
with it that drug use in addicts is voluntary, pleasure-seeking
behavior, and that we can draw no adverse conclusions about the
autonomy of addicts from their repetitive drug-seeking behavior.
In arguing against neurobiological versions of the Disease Model
of addiction they say this:
In plain English, if we repeatedly obtain some pleasurable
experience we start to want it more. It moves up the rankings
of experiences we would like to repeat. If we regularly engage
in an extremely pleasurable experience, it is only natural that
we will come to place a higher importance on that experience.
The Liberal View is not so minimal that it cannot say what
addictions are. They are strong appetites toward pleasure.
(2010: p. 15)1
On their view, although an addicted person may well periodically
regret his addictive behavior, he nevertheless at the moment of
consumption acts in order to satisfy an appetite for pleasure and
this choice is not obviously either irrational or lacking autonomy.
The Lay and Liberal positions provoke an inquiry into the rela-
tion between pleasure and addiction; in particular, they provoke
us to consider what role pleasure plays in the moral psychology
of the addicted agent. Are addicted persons motivated by pleasure
alone? And is pleasure the object of their actions throughout the
course of their addiction?
We will address these questions in two ways: first, we will exam-
ine the Choice account of motivation that we take to underlie the
LiberalView to test the status of the claim that addictive motivation
can be explained in terms of pleasure-seeking. What is meant by
this claim and what would count as evidence against it? Second, we
will probe the role that pleasure plays in addictive actions via evi-
dence sourced from addicted persons themselves. In a recent study
1All 2010 in-text references to Foddy and Savulescu will be to this work.
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(n= 69), semi-structured interviews were undertaken to explore
the effects of substance use on what addicted persons value, specif-
ically in relation to the ways addiction has impacted on the course
of their lives. During these interviews many of our subjects offered
accounts of the phenomenology of addiction and addictive moti-
vation. Our research indicates that there are important nuances to
the role that pleasure plays in addiction; that changes in motiva-
tions for substance use occur over the course of addiction; and that
there is variation in how pleasure itself is evaluated by the indi-
viduals concerned. We hope in these two ways to supply a richer
and more informative account of motivation in addiction than is
currently accepted by holders of either the Lay or Liberal view. Our
results, together with other evidence, suggest that addictive moti-
vation is complex, and make it doubtful that severely addicted
persons’ consumption can be subsumed under the category of
ordinary weakness of will.
CHOICE MODELS OF ADDICTION
Recently, models of addiction which arise from behavioral eco-
nomics and the psychology of choice have taken center stage
in the ongoing debate over how best to characterize what goes
wrong in addiction. Choice theorists see this model as breaking
the impasse between Medical models (including the brain dis-
ease model), which remove or diminish, perhaps unacceptably,
the agency of those who are addicted, and Moral or Lay models
which condemn them. Disease models claim that the behavior of
addicts is substantially involuntary – that it is caused by processes
which bypass deliberation and choice or that are impervious to
them. Moral models deny this and claim that the goals and values
of the addicted person are bad or their choices and actions are
weak in ways which reflect poorly on them.
By contrast, prominent choice theorists such as George Ainslie
(24) and Gene Heyman (25) argue that the universal principles
of choice that underlie ordinary behavior also explain the drug-
seeking behavior of addicts. If we want to explain what people
choose and do we must understand it in terms (broadly speaking)
of satisfactions sought or pains avoided. George Ainslie claims
that an economic theory of action must assume that the “individ-
ual is constrained to choose the option with the greatest expected
reward of all those she considers.” [(2), p. 116] It is impossible for
the agent to be more motivated to pursue a lesser perceived reward
over a greater reward when both are available to her. The addicted
person follows this pattern: her choices, like all other choices, aim
at reward and are responsive to incentives. She uses drugs because
they offer her more in the way of pleasure or reward than the
available alternatives. Seen like this we may think that her choices
are, in themselves, no more to be condemned than those of people
who are preoccupied with exercising, work, stamp-collecting, or
gourmet food – though like these other choices they may be crit-
icized if they impose unacceptable costs on others or are pursued
by unlawful means. Drug users, including those who are called
addicts, choose to use drugs, and upon examination the expla-
nation for what they do is of a piece with explanations of the
voluntary behavior by non-addicts. This, we take it, is central to
the Liberal View.
Models of addiction which propose that the user aims at the
highest reward on offer face an obvious problem that choices in
other domains usually do not: that of the not infrequent cases
in which continued drug use incurs heavy costs, such as loss
of employment, damaged relationships, legal penalties, and poor
health. Additionally the initial intense pleasure that drug use deliv-
ers tends to fade over time and so it is hard to see the pleasure
gained as outweighing the obvious costs. Ainslie and Heyman
explain the addicted person’s chronic drug-seeking in the face of
diminishing rewards and higher costs in the following way. Activ-
ities that are initially extremely highly rewarding set up inflated
expectations of future reward. The promise of drug rewards in the
immediate future combined with overly steep discounting of the
value of other more distant rewards is further exacerbated by the
toxic effects of addictive rewards on other natural rewards which
drain them of the pleasure which could normally be expected
from them. Drug use thus continues to promise, and they claim
to deliver, more reward than the immediately available alterna-
tives, even though the amount of pleasure on offer is substantially
reduced and even though, were the drug user to delay gratifica-
tion for long enough they would reap greater long-term rewards.
This model is argued to provide a more useful and more opti-
mistic framework than the disease model in providing directions
for treatment based on positive incentives that can out-compete
drug rewards.
One of us has argued elsewhere (3, 4) that the choice model and
the reward account of motivation on which it rests fails to provide
an adequate explanation of the actions of a small but significant
subset of those who are called addicts and so fails to set aside the
possibility that the disease model applies to this group. We will
not rehearse all of those arguments here but we flag our concern
that disease theorists and choice theorists may not be applying the
term “addict” to the same group and thus that conclusions that
may be warranted for the larger group of substance abusers who
mature out of harmful drug use upon acquisition of new interests
and responsibilities do not transfer to those hard core users with
whom clinicians are concerned.
Another concern with the Choice account centers on the mean-
ing of the term “reward” in the theory. According to this account,
even where it is difficult or impossible for us or for the person
concerned to identify the reward that drug-taking offers – as for
example in some cases of chronic alcoholism where the physical ill
effects of use are immediate and severe – ex hypothesis there must
be such a reward or the person would not keep choosing to use
drugs. In our view this claim is either trivial or false. We address
the triviality claim here; we will provide reason to think that any
substantive claim is false in a later section.
If we stipulate that all action aims at some reward (or relief),
then the conclusion that drug users are motivated by the rewarding
properties of their substance of choice follows from the fact that
their behavior is intentional. Choice reveals preference. Of course,
we can make this stipulation if we want. Our claims about the
role of reward in addiction will then be unfalsifiable, and so of no
interest, since the notion of reward is detached from its ordinary
meaning and loses any explanatory value. On this technical read-
ing of the notion of reward to say that some episode of drug use
aimed at reward means no more than to say that it was motivated.
This we do not dispute. The interesting question is whether reward
in the everyday sense is what motivates drug use in addiction.
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THE LIBERAL ACCOUNT OF ADDICTION
We see the Liberal View of addiction as arising from the picture
of human motivation promulgated by the choice theorists and as
gaining some warrant from it. Like the Choice theory the Liberal
view says we must start from the assumption that addicts act to
satisfy their strongest preferences and the driver for preferences
that Foddy and Savulescu nominate is an appetite for the pleasure
that drug use offers. They say “we should accept that many addicts
may be choosing to use drugs because they desire drug use more
than any other thing” (2010: p. 14).
Like choice theorists, Foddy and Savulescu reject the disease
model and its claims that addictive action is non-autonomous.
They claim that there is nothing special about the choices of those
who are addicted – their ordering of values may be different to
the non-addict, however, we cannot infer from this that their will
is diseased or their choice-making disordered (2010: p. 14). But
while choice theorists acknowledge the apparent irrationality of
addicted choices and seek to explain why addicts choose what
appears to be objectively worse for them over the long run, the
Liberal View holds that there is no principled reason to think
that addictive actions are irrational at all. Although, some actions
performed in the course of addiction may turn out to be non-
autonomous, so too may the apparently autonomous actions of
non-addicts (2010: p. 15). We are not entitled to make the judg-
ment that the bad or weak-willed choices of the addicted person
are worse or different in kind to bad or weak-willed choices made
by the non-addict.
Foddy and Savulescu’s target is the normative framework and
assumptions that surround drug use and inform both the Disease
and Moral Models. Absent the normative assumption that a life
devoted to the pleasures offered by drug use is lacking in value
we have no reason to suppose that the addict is lacking auton-
omy. Foddy and Savulescu think that if we adopt a neutral Liberal
position on the values at stake we must remain agnostic on the
question of the rationality and autonomy of addicts. The main
contours of their argument are as follows:
A. Neurobiological accounts of addiction that support the Disease
model do not sufficiently distinguish the behavior of addicted
persons from habitual behaviors for other non-drug-like sub-
stances, such as sugar, or activities like gambling (2010: p.
4–6)
B. Addictive behaviors are not irrational, nor can we say that they
are non-autonomous (2010: p. 7–8)
C. It is important not to confuse any negative consequences result-
ing from the consumption of addictive drugs arising from
cultural norms and legal sanctions against those practices, with
the consequences of consumption of those same drugs absent
those norms and sanctions (2010: p. 9) (A related point is a
normative bias in the Disease View: the DSM, for instance,
nominates as one diagnostic criterion continued use despite
knowledge that it is causing “a persistent or recurrent physical
or psychological problem.”).
D. Once we eliminate the errors of the opposing views all we can
safely say is that substance addiction involves the seeking and
taking of drugs in response to strong, regular, appetitive desires
(2010: p. 14).
Let us now unpack the points above in more detail. Habit-
ual actions that aim at satisfying desires for pleasure, considered
as a general category, lead to changes in neural architecture and
adaptations which cement new patterns of the same behavior. The
noteworthy thing about illicit drugs, say Foddy and Savulescu,
is only that the causal pathway to neural modification is special:
certain pleasure-involving receptors are targeted directly, and the
intensity of the effect is typically relatively high. But many foods
and non-drug-like substances also modify brain biology, they say,
as well as practices such as sex or gambling.
This observation leads to an argument: if these other sub-
stances, such as sugar, cause the same kinds of brain changes, and
addiction to illicit drugs is a brain disease, then regular consump-
tion of sugar is also a brain disease; but of course it is not. Why
single out illicit drugs then? Foddy and Savulescu suggest that the
reason illicit drugs are thought addictive and deserving of the dis-
ease tag, is that the category emerges from “unjustifiable factual
claims” based on cultural prejudices. For example, the attribution
of compulsion in addiction is generated by a normative bias that
is built into philosophical, political, and popular conceptions of
what a life ought to contain. In particular it should not contain
the selfish and destructive pleasure-seeking that addiction brings
about. But, say Foddy and Savulescu, this is indeed a bias, and it has
no place in deciding the criteria for addiction, qua a condition that
allegedly compromises rational autonomy. Their view is that we
do not know whether autonomy is compromised in addiction. So,
they claim, we should be skeptical of claims that addicted persons
are compelled in their behavior around the securing and taking of
drugs.
Why, according to Foddy and Savulescu, should we be skepti-
cal about the claims that the nature of addiction compromises the
capacity of persons to be effective in decision-making? Again, their
argument is complex, but two points they make stand out.
First, the cultural ideology around the evils of taking illicit
drugs provides powerful motivating reasons to internalize a nar-
rative that paints the addicted person as helpless and pow-
erless to control their urges to take mind-altering substances.
Indeed, addicted persons themselves utilize this conception of
their situation to deflect the stigma and opprobrium attaching
to this behavior. They may even be self-deceived. This would
not be surprising, say Foddy and Savulescu, for this reason:
“[g]iven that the average person subscribes to some version of
the Lay View, the worst thing an addict could say is that she
used drugs because she wanted to or because she enjoyed it.”
(2010: p. 9)
Second, Foddy and Savulescu nominate a heterogeneous set
of reasons, particularly from medicine and epidemiology, for
doubting the claims of compulsion. Again, they say, there is a
stereotypical view of drugs as causing withdrawal, but this is
overstated and cannot be generalized from the key case, heroin
addiction. In addition they note, with the choice theorists that
most people ultimately give up their drug habit by the age of
35. And many base their drug-taking behavior or abstention
around rational considerations, e.g., life choices such as preg-
nancy (2010: pp. 12–14). If their behavior was compelled it would
not be responsive to rational considerations and ordinary life
incentives.
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In the light of all this, Foddy and Savulescu sum up their own
view this way:
The Liberal View contains only three claims about addiction.
First, we do not know whether an addict values anything
more than the satisfaction of his addictive desires. Second,
we do not know whether an addict behaves autonomously
when they use drugs. Third, addictive desires are just strong,
regular appetitive desires. (2010: p. 14)
The conclusion is that we should err on taking at face value the
behavior of drug addicts – that they are rational choosers who
value drugs for their rewarding properties more than they value
the alternatives. Avoiding “normative bias” they say, we should
accept that on face value addicts are autonomous. The Liberal
account says that non-autonomy is not a defining condition of
addiction, even though some cases of addictive behavior might
turn out not to be autonomous. Addiction on the Liberal View is
a matter of acting on one’s strong appetitive desires for pleasure,
and that is all.
The Liberal view developed by Foddy and Savulescu can escape
the charge of triviality directed at the choice account, insofar as
it assumes that what motivates drug use in addiction is pleasure
and it characterizes pleasure as “[a] conscious sensation produced
by the brain that has the quality of being pleasant, satisfying, or
enjoyable” (2010: p. 19). Central to the Liberal View, is the claim
that addicted persons respond to incentives – that is what justifies
the prima facie assumption of autonomy – and the driving incen-
tive much of the time is pleasure (Foddy and Savulescu do agree
that drug use may fail to deliver on its aim of fulfilling pleasure.).
We will return to the question of responsiveness to incentives in
addiction later in this paper. Our main interest here is the role of
pleasure in addiction. Let us be clear: we do not question the claim
that a life devoted to pleasure-seeking may be autonomously cho-
sen. Nor do we deny that some of those who are called addicts are
autonomously choosing a life centered on drug pleasures or that
many of the harms suffered by drug users are the result of illiberal
social and legal policies which stigmatize such pleasures (though
we note this does not apply to the very significant harms caused by
legal and socially approved drugs like alcohol). What we do deny is
that pleasure or reward plays the central motivating role assigned
to it by Choice theorists and by Liberal accounts in an important
set of cases and these are precisely the cases where we have most
reason to question the autonomy of the addict.
Our self-report data suggest strongly that we should con-
strue the role of pleasure somewhat differently to how the choice
accounts would have it, especially when it is conceived as part
of a narrative dynamic. The role of pleasure in addiction must
be understood as changing over time. While a strong desire for
pleasure plays a crucial role for many, perhaps most, people in
establishing addiction, it is not so clear that pleasure or the expec-
tation of pleasure plays this role in maintaining addiction. If it
does not and we cannot easily construe the behavior of the addict
as aiming at reward then there will be reason to question each of
the three claims made by the Liberal View.
In Section “The Diachronic Value of Pleasure in Addiction”
we present our self-report data to support our claims around the
more nuanced understanding of pleasure in addiction. Before that,
however, we respond to the claim made by Foddy and Savulescu
that the self-report data from those with addiction problems is
unreliable.
CANWE RELY ON SELF-REPORT DATA TO UNDERSTAND THE
ROLE OF PLEASURE IN ADDICTION?
Foddy and Savulescu claim that because of the taboo nature of
addiction, it becomes, according to those who reject self-report
data, “. . .impossible to obtain honest accounts from addicted per-
sons themselves. . .” (2010: p. 3, our italics). They say, “[t]here
is enormous social pressure for addicts to provide an alternative
explanation for their drug use” [(1): p. 9]. This echoes a similar
observation by Dalrymple (5) who has said that when working
as a psychiatrist, he was always struck by how differently users
described their addiction to him (in terms of suffering and invol-
untariness) compared with what they would say to their peers
in the hallway (in terms of pleasure). The claim is that addicted
persons will be reluctant to express to professionals and others
the pleasure-incentive that is really driving their addictive actions.
This claim presupposes that addicted persons are being honest and
truthful with their peers and not with professionals.
While it is plausible to suppose that socially available narra-
tives of addiction influence what users say to clinicians, courts and
other concerned parties about their drug use, we think that the
claim that it is impossible to obtain from them honest accounts
of their motivations for use is overstated, unfair to those who seek
help for their drug use or who participate in research projects, and
lacking a solid evidential basis.
We suggest that: (i) Addicted persons may be ambivalent about
their using and this will be reflected in differing accounts given to
different groups. (ii) What they say to peers is not obviously more
reliable than what they say to professionals from whom they have
sought help, but even if it is, the data that we have collected is not
subject to these biases. (iii) There is also social pressure on many
people struggling with addiction to remain users when they would
prefer to quit, or to use more than they want to, and this social
pressure plausibly influences what they say to peers. (iv) We should
distinguish between the heat of the moment and the cool reflective
moment in determining what it is that people really prefer.
First, we think that insofar as users express different attitudes
to different groups this may reflect genuine ambivalence about
their drug use, as different considerations are brought to the fore.
When with family the damage done to family relationships and the
hurt suffered by those near to them will be more salient than it is
with peers. With professionals damage to health and to long-term
prospects comes to the fore. With peers, the pleasures induced
by the drug and its social aspects will be most prominent. The
question, then, is not whether the individual is lying to one of
these groups. The question is, of the accounts they give, which,
if any, should be privileged in providing reliable testimony con-
cerning what motivates their drug use. Given the expression of
different attitudes to different groups, attitudes underpinned by a
rationale responsive to that context, there is no a priori reason for
thinking one of these groups is privileged as the group to receive
the truthful account. In particular we do not know whether an
addicted person’s statement to a fellow user misrepresents their
understanding of what motivates them.
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Second, the responses to our own study provide reasons to
doubt that addicted persons are honest with their peers (a context
where the taboo of taking drugs for pleasure does not operate)
and not with those professionals with whom they are engaged.
Our questionnaire reflected none of the normative biases Foddy
and Savulescu identify, and we made clear to the participants that
our role as philosophers (not treatment professionals), oriented us
to an interest in their story, and their experiences. Our open style
of questioning was designed to avert any sense of being judgmen-
tal and the semi-structured nature of the interviews meant that we
maximized the possibility of eliciting clear and reflective accounts
of respondents’ understandings of the role pleasure played in their
addictive experiences. Respondents repeatedly stated that they
wanted to be honest with us, that they enjoyed the conversa-
tion and felt listened to. Sometimes they asked us directly if we
wanted the socially accepted explanation or if we wanted to hear
what they really thought. It became clear that respondents were
not reluctant to express to us the nature of their using, its extent,
and the kinds of incentives that drove this behavior, including
pleasure. We will explore their reflections on pleasure in the next
section.
Third, some of the responses we collected suggest that we
should be cautious about privileging what they say to their peers
over professionals and others, in seeking to explain their behavior.
Social pressure cuts both ways and many long-term addicts live in
a social milieu in which using is expected and abstinence is seen
as a threat, an implied criticism, or socially unacceptable.
The other addicts aren’t really . . .they don’t want to see some-
one get on with their life “cause then. . . oh this is what I
think, then. . . it’s saying to them, may be you can do this
but they don’t want to. . . they’re comfortable. I don’t know,
it’s kind of like misery loves company. . . you can have so
many friends when you’re miserable and everybody wants to
hear all your problems and they’re all so consoling you know
but sometimes I wonder if they’re not being patronizing and
they really like to. . . “cause I notice when I’m going well, no-
one’s that happy and it’s like no-one wants to give you a shot
when you’re hanging out but when you’ve been clean for six
months everyone wants to give you a shot, it’s things like that
I’ve noticed, you know. (R67)”
That’s another big step because all my so-called friends are
down here and to leave them is going to be hard, but they’re
not really friends anyway, they’re just acquaintances through
pubs and drugs, that’s pretty much it. So, yeah, to leave them
it’s going to hurt them, but it’s probably not going to hurt
me as much as it’s going to hurt them, but what can you
do, you’ve got to get rid of the old people, you know what I
mean? (R5)
He’s [his boss, who also has a drinking problem] always
ringing up to come to work, even if I have a day off – “Are you
going to come tomorrow? I’ll even come and get you.”“Yeah
I’ll be there, I’ll be there.” And he’d say “You got any beers in
your bags?” and I say “No.” I know I got beers in the bags;
as soon as I get to work I’ll open a beer, [and] by lunchtime
he’s looking at me going “fuck it,” let’s go and get a beer, and
I’ve already had six by then and I’m thinking oh, I don’t really
need another one but I go with him and then I might have
another six that afternoon. (R6)
Finally, and in response to the preceding considerations, it is com-
mon in philosophy and in common-sense, to distinguish between
what people want and what they “really want” or value and the dif-
ferential responses may in part reflect this distinction. Gary Watson
describes a person’s values as: “. . .that set of considerations which
he – in a cool and non-deceptive moment – articulates as definitive
of the good, fulfilling, and defensible life”[(6), p. 105]. However, as
Watson points out, our valuational system and our motivational
system may come apart. Another related distinction is between
people’s experiential interests and their critical interests [(7): p.
201]. The former are satisfied when a person’s present inclination
for certain kinds of felt experiences is met. Desiring a warm bath
and lying in it, having a wish to smell roses and smelling them,
having a yen to hear Bach and listening to it, all count as examples.
Critical interests, by contrast, are not tied either to the present, or
to any kind of feeling. That one’s treasured antique violin is passed
down to a grandchild, or that one’s standing in the community as
a decent citizen is recognized would count as examples of critical
interests.
These distinctions provide an alternative explanation to self-
deception or pressure to adopt socially acceptable narratives of
addiction where there are instances of different content or empha-
sis in what is said to professionals and what is said to peers.
When addicted persons are with their drug using peers, attention-
grabbing drug cues abound. Their experiential interests or imme-
diate urges dominate their attention and what they say about drug
use then is much more likely to be, as it were, in the heat of the
moment. In a more reflective moment when their critical inter-
ests come to the fore, such as when they are with a therapist or
a researcher, they are likely to express a measured assessment of
their drug use which encourages them to describe how it impacts
on their life extended over a longer period than the time it takes
to make the next score.
Foddy and Savulescu’s reason for dismissing the possibility of
reliable first hand reports is the taboo nature of drugs and plea-
sure that supposedly prevents the addict from delivering an honest
appraisal of their drug-related activities to those outside their peer
group. As we’ve shown there is reason to think that this assessment
is unduly pessimistic – especially surely as applied to alcohol. If
that is right then any claim that we should privilege what users say
to their peers over what they say to professionals and others must
turn on privileging experiential interests and synchronic desires
for pleasure over critical interests and diachronic values, and this
is a matter on which the Liberal view must remain agnostic. While
both perspectives must be taken seriously, and are equally impor-
tant in understanding addiction, in our view the persistence of
grief, regret, and internal conflict in many of our subjects (includ-
ing many alcoholics) provides at least a prima facie reason for
privileging their critical interests.
THE DIACHRONIC VALUE OF PLEASURE IN ADDICTION
While the self-reports of those who are addicted cannot tell the
whole story of the role of pleasure in addiction, self-report data
provides a valuable insight into the changing role of pleasure over
the course of addiction. In this section we will draw on material
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from qualitative interviews with 69 opioid and alcohol-dependent
subjects in order to counter what we think is the overly narrow
understanding of pleasure in addiction assumed in the choice
accounts. As we have said, we agree that a life of pleasure could
be autonomously preferred and that some user’s lives may be
autonomously structured around the pursuit of drug-related plea-
sures. Most of our subjects did not characterize or experience their
lives or their drug-seeking as autonomous in this way. However,
our interviews revealed a nuanced and changing role for pleasure
across the course of addiction.
On the basis of our interviews we can distinguish three sub-
groups of users: the first group said that pleasure was their main
motivation for using substances. On the Schwartz Value Ques-
tionnaire they scored “hedonism” as their most important value.
But this simple nomination disguised an important aspect of their
self-understanding in relation to the incentive pleasure gave them.
Pleasure was, for them, intensely motivating, but they realized that
in the long run the damage their drug use caused had the effect of
hindering their goal of a hedonistic life. They were disposed to stop
their consumption for hedonistic reasons, and yet found doing
so beyond them. The Liberal account argues that even in these
cases where pleasure is the only value at stake, there is no reason
to think one’s short term appetites must align with one’s long-
term hedonistic project to maximize the rewards of consumption
over time. What they say is in line with the Choice model: at the
moment of consumption, it is the appetitive reward the person
most wants, and that although this may count as weak-willed it is
not prima facie non-autonomous. Our view is that, on the con-
trary, the extraordinary difficulty some subjects face in orienting
themselves toward the pleasure they both want and value most sig-
nifies an important loss of control – of self-authorship. We make
good on this claim in a later section.
The second group consisted of people who cited pleasure as the
initial reason for consuming; over time, however, after repeated
use, the pleasurable effects of the substances they were taking faded
out and pleasure was no longer their main motivation for use. The
third group claimed to have never really experienced pleasure from
using. For both the second and third group their ongoing moti-
vation to use drugs was something of a mystery to them. They
explained it by reference to addiction – which they seemed to
experience as a motivating force distinct from any interest in or
expectation of pleasure.
PLEASURE ALL THE WAY THROUGH, BUT A PLEASURABLE LIFE IS
MORE THAN USING
We identified a sub-group of users who acknowledged they were
motivated primarily by pleasure. Still, even for this group our data
shows that the Choice model may be too simplistic. Those who
valued hedonism did so based on an understanding of that notion
that was broader than just the “instant pleasure” derivable from
substance use; their sense of the value of pleasure was diachronic
in nature.
A hedonistic lifestyle, as understood by many of those we inter-
viewed, is not reducible to a narrowly focused pleasure-seeking
or seen in terms of the aggregation of a set of pleasurable experi-
ences. Only a minority of the respondents described themselves as
pleasure seekers in this narrow sense, and even they were skeptical
about the contribution of substance use to their hedonistic lifestyle
in the long run. One person, who described himself as hedonis-
tic, made clear that substance use was only part of a hedonistic
life. Other users described how drug use can conflict with other
primarily hedonistic values, such as holidays and material goods,
which nevertheless require planning and a diachronic perspective
at odds with the synchronic focus induced by substance use.
I just enjoyed life and work but life more than work (. . .).
I think I wanted to be successful. I was very hedonistic. You
know I wanted the right clothes; I wanted to eat in the right
restaurants and be with the right people,go to the right parties
and that sort of thing. (MHE 001)
When you’re drinking you’re just thinking of the moment,
you’re not thinking of anything else sort of thing, anyone or
anything in particular you know, you’re just thinking about
having a good time and a laugh and a joke maybe with a
couple of friends that you’re with or something like that, but
you’re not. . . it’s not as if you’re sitting there talking about
planning and buying a house or what are we going to do. . .
plan a holiday to go overseas next year or something like
that. (R32)
One young female alcoholic stated that although she was doing
many nice things in her life (including a job she enjoyed, and fre-
quently attending festivals), due to her excessive alcohol use, she
was not able to remember many of those enjoyable things and that
her alcohol use was also frequently spoiling enjoyable occasions.
Another user described herself as a “willing addict”; she claimed
that all she had ever wanted to become in life was an addict. How-
ever this seemed tightly connected with a kind of status she had
within her using and dealing family gained by her ability to be able
to get every prescribed medication she wanted from the time she
was a minor, rather than from the pleasures of use itself.
Additionally most of our respondents were highly skeptical
about the possibility of long-term use without significant negative
consequences.
Well don’t get me wrong, I love using mate. If I could use
successfully I would. I’d still be using. I love using; I just don’t
like the shit that comes with it. (R50)
Another respondent described it as follows:
Heroin is an astonishing thing. I will never. . . regret taking
heroin. In fact those two years I took heroin are actually one
of the best two years of my life. (P1)
Yet this respondent did decide to stop because of the negative con-
sequences of his use. He describes the experience of coming off
heroin as an extra bill he had to pay for his use, an extra hard time.
Adherents to the Choice model will say that such cases make their
point. It shows that people will stop using when the costs become
too high – and of course many of those costs are a result of the
unjustified normative bias which stigmatizes drug use.
In response we agree that many people do stop using when
the costs rise and this may be particularly true of this hedonistic
sub-group.
But others don’t even when, from their own point of view the
costs are manifestly enormous – including impending death – and
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the hedonistic benefits are invisible. If the Choice and Liberal the-
orist’s claim that addicts will stop when the costs become too high
amounts to the truism that addicts will stop using when their
momentary drives to use no longer outweigh competing motiva-
tions they have done no more than reiterate their own account of
motivation. The important issue for us is why some individual’s
motivations are unresponsive to massively increasing costs and
decreasing rewards and whether this calls into question the Lib-
eral prima facie assumption of rationality or autonomy in these
cases.
The assumption of the Liberal and Lay views that addicts freely
choose to take addictive substances for their rewarding properties
certainly has application to a sub-group of addicted persons. How-
ever we see that even in this group people are quite skeptical about
the contribution of substances to a pleasurable lifestyle in the long
run. Although they don’t necessarily regret their use and still like
the effects of the substance, they acknowledge the ways in which
repeated consumption for instant pleasure ultimately undermines
other diachronic values and reasons that they endorse. The Liberal
view accepts this latter nuance, but insists that individuals among
this group remain motivated by their appetite for the rewards of
their preferred substance and that we have no special reason to
suppose they lack autonomy. To do so is unjustifiably to privi-
lege their reflective preferences over their first order preferences.
We think that there is an important difference between the ini-
tial motivational profile of the hedonist drug user who smoothly
translates her pleasure-oriented values into action and the same
person later on, utterly disabused of the belief that drug use will
promote her hedonistic ends, but who is nevertheless episodically
motivated to consume drugs when the cues pressuring her to do
so become overwhelming – a difference relevant to the assessment
of autonomy.
INITIAL PLEASURE
This group of respondents said they used substances for their plea-
surable effects, but only, or especially, at the start of their addiction.
They described their initial use as a honeymoon period, until their
lives began to fall apart, a period in which substance use ceased to
be pleasurable:
that’s the love-hate thing I have with. . . when I first started, I
liked the feeling but then once I got addicted I didn’t like it.
And I always wanted to quit because of that. (FHE 041)
This group, for whom drug use no longer produces pleasure and
who want to quit, divides between those who end up using to ame-
liorate the negative effects of craving and withdrawal and those for
whom pleasure or relief ceases to play a useful explanatory role.
I mean some people will say oh, the drugs stopped working
for me. I don’t agree, you know, I don’t believe that. . . I mean
I think if they weren’t working you wouldn’t do them. They
do. They make a person feel. . . (. . .) and then after a while,
when I said it takes on a life of its own, what you get is the
sort of relief that you get when you stop (. . .) running, you
know (. . .) you’re really punching that last couple of Ks out
or whatever (. . .) ‘cause you know that when (. . .) you get
to that certain point and you get that needle into your arm
and you get it you’ll be able to breathe, you’ll be able to go,
oh, phew, it’s . . . that’s all better, it’s [like] bashing your head
against a brick wall, it feels so good when you stop. (MHE 9)
While it sounds odd to portray those who use substances to relieve
unpleasant sensations as living a hedonic existence, drug use for
such individuals might still be the most rewarding option. The
relief described by this user is indeed fully consistent with the
choice model and can be accommodated by Foddy and Savulescu.
Yet even where our users’ stories are consistent with the claims
of the choice account we think these accounts miss something
important in the phenomenology of addiction. The idea of drug
use “taking on a life of its own” recurs throughout our interviews.
It is the point at which drug use ceases to serve its original hedonic
function and becomes detached from the user’s perceived interests,
values, and desires.
We think that for a significant sub-group of users pleasure
ceases to have the explanatory value attached to it by Foddy and
Savalescu, and that at some point neurobiological models, such as
that proposed by Robinson and Berridge (8); Berridge et al. (9),
and Koob and Volkow (10), are a better fit with their reported
experiences. The fit between the neurobiology, the phenomenol-
ogy, and the behavior may be thought to constitute converging
lines of evidence for the view we present. We do not suggest that
the neurobiological evidence could be sufficient on its own.
These neurobiological models do however purport to provide
an explanation of the shifting role of pleasure in different stages
of addiction that our subjects and others describe. Although ini-
tial substance use can release a large amount of dopamine in
the brain, causing intense feelings of pleasure, repeated substance
use has quite a different effect. Because the brain is over-fueled
with dopamine, neural changes in the reward pathways occur to
restore the balance, such as the decrease of post-synaptic dopamine
receptors, to overcome the effect of the substance. This results in
tolerance for the substance (with less pleasure experienced), but
also a higher threshold for experiencing those rewards obtained
from normal rewarding activities, like food, sex, and social cooper-
ation. Koob and Volkow (10) call this the“motivational withdrawal
syndrome,” roughly, the emergence of a negative emotional state –
anhedonia – that occurs after abstinence [(10), p. 217]. This state
can persist for months or even years after abstinence.
But that is not the only change caused by the huge surges
in dopamine release by substance use. Dopamine’s function is
twofold: it primes us on the circumstances or cues in which the
pleasurable event occurs, and it reinforces behavior that is directed
to those goals. These effects occur because the intensity of a drug
experience provides a learning signal that this reward was better
than expected. On the next occasion when the same cues appear
we will be more sensitive in our recognition of the type of activity
generating what we have learnt, and we will be disposed to pay
attention and direct our behavior accordingly (11, 12). The huge
amount of dopamine release works as a Trojan horse that overtakes
the reward-related learning process and creates long-term associa-
tive memory processes directing a person to further substance use
[(13). p. 575]. Becoming hypersensitive for drug-associated cues
then occurs mostly in the absence of subjective feelings of pleasure.
Thus the increasingly addicted person continues to want a sub-
stance they no longer have a strong liking for. Repeated substance
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use increases compulsive wanting, or craving, and at the same
time diminishes experienced pleasure. Normally we want what
we like, and we like what we want, but Berridge (14) has shown
that these systems operate through different neural pathways. It
is not so much the pleasurable effect (the liking) that drives the
addicted person, but the reinforcing, conditioned learning aspects
of dopamine driving the behavior (15).
Summing up, there is a major strand of research that argues that
the neurobiological effects of sustained drug use help to under-
stand and characterize the function of pleasure for this group.
This group learns to continue wanting a drug that has ceased to
generate for them the pleasure it originally had. This is not just a
“very strong appetite” for pleasure as this is normally understood.
It has compulsive elements divorced from any person-level expec-
tation of pleasure, in that it captures and monopolizes the addicted
person’s attention making it extremely difficult for them to focus
on and pursue other more valued activities.
We acknowledge that the science is far from settled, so it pays to
be cautious in recruiting data to support philosophical theorizing.
Philosophers lack the expertise to adjudicate between positions
within the neuroscience of addiction. But we do not in any case
claim what Foddy and Savulescu are especially keen to deny – that
this research establishes that addiction is a brain disease or that
addictive action is somehow not intentional. We take no posi-
tion here on whether addiction is a brain disease (We think that
some of the common arguments against the disease claim are bad
arguments, but that’s another story.). We do not think that an
argument that the autonomy of addicts is impaired depends on
establishing a disease model or upon showing that addicts do not
intend and choose those of their actions that are motivated by
their drug-related urges.
While it is clearly true, as the choice model emphasizes, that
the particular actions an addicted person undertakes in procuring
and consuming drugs are responsive to a variety of contingen-
cies, we think this flexibility is not as significant as proponents
of such models have it. In particular it does not show that drug
consumption is not in some sense compelled, or that it must be
the most rewarding synchronic option available, at least on any
ordinary understanding of the notion of reward [see (3) on this
point]. On a view which sees wanting and liking as dissociable and
dissociated in many long-term users, drug use ceases to be chosen
in the sense proposed by the choice models, that is, as rationally
responsive, either globally or locally, to an evaluation of the rewards
on offer. The means taken to drug use may indeed be flexible and
responsive to local contingencies and so drug use can be delayed
or moderated in some circumstances, but the goal itself seems to
be a stubborn feature of their psychology. In the hard core user it is
relatively impervious to reflection, choice, and control, even when
it is clearly highly dysfunctional. We think that this is an important
feature of addiction. Drug use becomes, as one of our respondents
put it, like a chore or an “obligation.” It becomes something they
have to do but that they no longer enjoy or understand themselves
doing. Here is a representative sample capturing this idea:
Yeah but now it’s just. . . it’s not even fun anymore really, it just
sort of becomes a. . . I don’t know, more or less like a chore I
suppose but yeah I just. . . I want to get away from it. (R29)
It’s. . . there was reason, early part, until I came to under-
stand why I was behaving the way I was behaving. So in. . .
no, not now. No. There’s no reason. (R39)
[W]hen I was 20, 30, when I was 40 my drinking was
good, I had good times on the drink, from when I was 50 to
60 just. . . I’m just drinking for nothing (. . .) I’m just drinking
for drinking sake now. (R24)
Now Foddy and Savulescu may counter that we see the same phe-
nomenon in the other kinds of cases they give. Perhaps repeated
high consumption of sugar or repeated gambling has the same
effects in some people and so they feel driven to consume or to
gamble even though they say they no longer enjoy it, and even
though it has disastrous consequences which they certainly do
not enjoy. If this were to be the case we would not see it as rea-
son either to reject those neurobiological or phenomenological
accounts which accept the liking/wanting dissociation in addic-
tion, or to become skeptical about the category of addiction. The
relevant behavior is addictive even if it responds to substances or
stimuli which do not usually pose a risk of addiction2.
NEVER EXPERIENCED PLEASURE
Summing up, the groups we have described so far report that
although the drug use fulfilled a certain role for a period of time,
at some point this ceased to be the case. It ceased either because
tolerance led to a loss of pleasure, or because, for more complicated
reasons, their drug use could no longer be rationally or success-
fully incorporated as part of a more sophisticated hedonistically
motivated lifestyle. They developed a love-hate relationship, or
simply a hate relationship, with their drug of choice as the pleasure
diminished and the costs became too high.
We can now distinguish a third group who don’t describe any
feelings of pleasure or hedonism when using drugs. Some within
this group emphasized the strong physical dependency that came
with their consumption:
[A] lot of people talk about a honeymoon period on drugs.
I can’t remember a time like that, I can remember starting
2We think that behavioral evidence and phenomenological report strongly suggest
both the dissociation between wanting and liking in human addicts that Berridge
claims to have found in rats, and the monopolization of attention and cue-driven
action in addiction. Certainly the claims about monopolization of attention, cue
sensitization, and cue-driven behavior in addiction are uncontroversial and have
been established in many psychological studies that do not rely on neuroscience.
Addiction neuroscience aims to uncover the neural mechanisms that drive behav-
ior. Perhaps the work we have cited – though it is certainly in the mainstream – does
not successfully uncover those mechanisms and explain the observed phenomena.
It might explain too little: there could be other relevant pathways that explain addic-
tions not well explained by the dopamine theory. It might on the other hand explain
too much. This seems to be the thrust of much of Foddy and Savulescu’s discussion
of the data. They say the same responses have been observed for a wide range of
non-drug substances so either we must say that people may be addicted to all these
other substances (a reductio) or the research simply describes normal responses to
pleasure and does not serve to support the view that addicts are in any way impaired
(qua addicted). Perhaps they are right; more work needs to be done to test this view.
But there is at least a respectable body of opinion that people may form addictions
to non-drug substances such as sugar and to activities such as gambling, with sim-
ilar behavioral features and consequences (mutatis mutandis) to drug addictions.
Whether this will extend to include such apparently innocent substances such as
water and milk as Foddy and Savulescu suggest remains to be seen since the studies
they refer to have not, to our knowledge, been replicated.
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drugs and pretty much straight away trying to stop all the
time. Like I know people talk about that it was nice and excit-
ing and it was a carnival at the beginning but I didn’t find
it like that (. . .). I hardly even remember starting drugs, I
mostly remember trying to stop all the time. (R47)
Others within this group described the use of substances as a way
to feel normal, as a painkiller, or self-medication for psychological
problems. One young woman described how she always felt she
didn’t have a right to belong in the world the same way other peo-
ple do, she would stare in the mirror for hours, trying to figure out
who she was.
[U]sing heroin made me feel normal, it took that away, so I
didn’t feel bad about it at all, I thought I’ll do anything I can
to get it, I don’t mind if I have to work [in prostitution] and
I thought that it was the only thing that would help but of
course it’s taken everything away from me now (. . .). Yeah I
didn’t use it to have fun I used it to feel normal, then it turned
into just an addiction. (R22)
Addiction is seen by many of our subjects as a motivating force
that is separate to and distinct from the desires for pleasure or
relief or acceptance that originally motivated their drug use and as
undermining both their pleasures and their plans. In the light of
the costs their drug use imposes on them we think that, for at least a
subset of users, pleasure, and reward do not explain continued use.
AUTONOMY AND ADDICTION
In light of the distinctions of the role of pleasure in addiction
we think it appropriate to respond more fully to an argument
from Foddy and Savulescu regarding addiction and autonomy. We
would claim that the evidence of dissatisfaction and repeated failed
attempts to quit calls into question the autonomy of the addict. We
do not assert that it calls into question a substantive conception of
autonomy, for we are not here making any normative claims about
the irrationality of seeking pleasure through substances over more
healthy activities. We agree with Foddy and Savulescu [(1): p. 8]
that in testing whether addiction threatens autonomy the correct
conception is a procedural account. Then the question of whether
autonomy is threatened has nothing to do with the content of the
desire one acts upon, yet fails to identify with or endorse. Whether
autonomy is threatened is a matter of whether the machinery of
the will – involving the interplay between the motivational and val-
uational systems – functions properly. Foddy and Savulescu claim
that addiction does not diverge in any significant way from many
other phenomena in which agents repeatedly regret past actions.
They write (p8)
Human beings make choices they regret, sometimes even
repeatedly. There may be an ideal conception of autonomy,
according to which making choices in the knowledge that
one will regret them later, is non-autonomous. But telling us
that addiction is non-autonomous in this sense is telling us
very little: It is not distinguishing it from ordinary cases of
weakness of will.
But, on the contrary, we think severe cases of addiction are not
like the ordinary cases of weakness of will they have in mind. To
explain this more fully we invoke a tripartite distinction between
wanting, liking, and valuing. In ordinary cases of weakness of will
wanting combines with liking in opposing the agent’s best judg-
ment. When I eat chocolate though I’m on a diet or snuggle up
in bed instead of going for an early morning swim in accordance
with my fitness regime I am doing what I both want to do and
enjoy doing at that time though I think that all things considered
I should be doing something else and even though I know I will
regret it later. But I like chocolate and warm beds. If I did not, my
actions would be puzzling indeed.
That we can describe these cases as weakly giving in to one’s
desires for chocolate or for comfort makes sense partly because
the pleasure or reward competes against the value judgment3. Are
cases of addiction just like this? If they are, then we do indeed have
reason to be skeptical about the category of addiction, since in the
story just given we have no reason to conclude that I am addicted
to chocolates, warm beds, or whatever else.
However, if we take the self-report data from addicts seriously,
as we have argued that we should, this is not true of at least a
subset of addicts for whom even the immediate outcome of their
consumption is dominated by pain and regret. For this group, plea-
sure (or reward) and the expectation of pleasure (or reward) – that
is, what they like – has dropped out of the picture4. An appetite
toward pleasure or reward does not explain their actions. Here the
competition is between valuing and mere wanting. You may want
something you neither like nor value; furthermore you may want it
so strongly that you simply cannot stop thinking about or success-
fully inhibit the automatic action tendencies that arise in response
to environmental cues, and any attempt you make at synchronic
self-control will eventually fail. Both strength and persistence of
wanting and the opposition of wanting to liking or valuing, are
important elements of what distinguishes weakness of will – even
persistent weakness of will – from compulsion. Autonomy comes
in degrees and while there will be borderline cases we claim that
at least some hard cases of addiction are clear cases of compulsion
rather than weakness of will – even chronic weakness of will – or
unthinking habit5. If the distinctions outlined here are correct they
suggest that addiction cannot be as readily assimilated to everyday
moral experience as proponents of the Liberal View suppose and
places the onus back on them to explain, consistently with their
view, what has gone wrong in such cases.
We see a significant problem with the Liberal position of
neutrality between synchronic and diachronic perspectives in an
3This is not the full story of weakness of will. See Kennett (20) for a detailed account.
4That is, the expectation of pleasure at a personal level. Perhaps the system “expects”
pleasure – in the sense laid out by the neurobiological accounts. If so the explanation
of action is sub-personal and as argued elsewhere (3) this would be inconsistent with
an important feature of choice accounts – that the addict’s action is susceptible to a
rationalizing explanation, in terms of their beliefs and expected reward.
5Note: this is not to suggest that addicts lack autonomy altogether or that it is impos-
sible for the compelled addict to reduce or quit – since they may be able to avail
themselves of techniques of diachronic self-control. Nor is to suggest that chroni-
cally weak-willed individuals are not also lacking autonomy. We think they are to the
extent that they become synchronic, disunified agents – see discussion below and
see also Levy (21) for an interpretation along these lines of the failure of autonomy
in addiction. There is no space here to provide a complete description and defense
of the distinction we have outlined between weakness of will and compulsion: for
a book length treatment see Kennett (20), and for particular application to the case
of addiction see Kennett (3, 22) and Kennett et al. (23).
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account of autonomy. The Liberal position does not want to priv-
ilege the satisfaction of our reflective desires over the satisfaction
of desires formed in the heat of the moment. We of course agree
that the satisfaction of momentary desires for such things as food,
sex, or drugs can often contribute value to someone’s life, and that
we should not automatically assume that a person who prioritizes
synchronic pleasures lacks autonomy. A view which prioritizes
reflective preferences can accommodate the endorsement of the
satisfaction of synchronic desires as autonomous and can also
describe when they become non-autonomous. But what, on the
neutral Liberal view, could count as impaired autonomy at all?
Foddy and Savulescu agree that it is possible some addicts lack
autonomy. Which addicts, and what would they have to lack qua
addicts for Foddy and Savulescu to count them as having impaired
autonomy?
Let us briefly sketch a reason for thinking that the procedural
account we favor is to be preferred over neutrality. Who or what
can be autonomous? It seems to us that a condition of autonomy
is diachronic agency. Purely synchronic agents, e.g., very young
children or deeply amnesic patients, cannot be autonomous. You
need to be capable of remembering the past and projecting yourself
into the future – you need the capacity for mental time travel –
in order to be autonomous. But of course mere access to your
past and the capacity to predict the likely future is not enough
for autonomous agency. As two of us have argued at length else-
where both planning and diachronic self-control are fundamental
to the construction of the kind of unified agent who can properly
be held responsible for their actions (16–19). The importance of
diachronic capacities and perspectives in the construction of an
agent who is even so much as capable of autonomy or failures of
autonomy does at least suggest a reason for privileging the reflec-
tive perspective in identifying when autonomy is impaired and to
what degree. In severe cases of addiction the radical impairments
to diachronic agency can be understand only when we see the indi-
vidual as failing to unify their agency in accord with their reflective
selves.
CONCLUSION
Pleasure seems to play a significant role in addiction though this
diminishes across time and users become increasingly resentful
of, or despairing of, the effects of their substance use on their
capacity to realize other values. The Lay and Liberal Views are of
course right that a desire for pleasure can play an important role in
explaining consumption in first-stage substance use, though this
excludes the category of users who self-medicate. But in the long
run the influence of substance use on health and on social relation-
ships seems, to many users, not to be worth the trouble, especially
when the early pleasurable effects fade. Yet, for a significant num-
ber of users in this group, the loss of pleasure does not result in a
cessation of addictive use. Even for the people who seemed to want
to pursue a life of hedonism, substance use has only a temporary
role in this. Although our respondents did not deny the plea-
surable effects of substances during the early stages of their use,
they were mostly quite skeptical about the pleasurable effects in
the long run. This seems to us to present a problem for accounts
that depend on an assumption that the desires for pleasurable
rewards continue, more or less in the same form, throughout dif-
ferent phases of addiction. The Lay View seems particularly taken
with this assumption. It also presents a problem for the idea that
we should err on the side of assuming that those who are called
addicts are rational choosers who value drugs for the pleasure they
produce more than they value anything else.
Our interviews combined with other data call into question
each of Foddy and Savulescu’s three assumptions: First, while we
do not know for certain whether any addict values anything more
than the satisfaction of his addictive desires, the clear unhappiness
of many of them with their drug-taking lifestyle and their repeated
attempts to quit suggest that they do.
Second, the same evidence of unhappiness and failed attempts
to quit also calls into question the autonomy of the addict. Many
are no longer motivated by what they like about drugs and so
cannot be characterized correctly as acting weakly in the way we
might characterize someone who regrets eating too much choco-
late (for pleasure) on some occasion. The addicted person is not
weak of will in that sense. The stubborn resistance of their goals
to their reflective judgments is not properly explained by assimi-
lation to ordinary cases of temptation where for the most part we
do manage to act in accordance with our judgments.
Third, addictive desires appear to shift from being,“just strong,
regular appetitive desires” to desires which have lost the ordinary
connection with reward. With or without any normative bias that
may play a role in shaping an addicted person’s preference struc-
ture, it is misleading to portray people struggling with addiction
simply as motivated by strong appetites for pleasure. For the last
group we identified it looks false. Those people never experienced
the claimed rewards. Others struggle to quit despite extraordinar-
ily heavy and increasing costs. Many of our respondents continued
using in the face of costs which were not comfortably relegated to a
distant and discounted future but were rather experienced by them
daily, including at the point of use – such as pain, serious, and dis-
abling health problems, and very credible risk of death. In our
view it does not appear that such users are acting autonomously
on the basis of a strong appetite for pleasure, or that their moti-
vation conforms to the supposed universal principles underlying
the choice model. If the choice view or the minimal Liberal view
licenses agnosticism on the issue of whether such individuals suffer
impaired autonomy or not it leaves us wondering what, if anything,
a clear case of impaired autonomy could be.
As one of us has argued elsewhere, to insist either that such users
are motivated by pleasure or reward or to make this the default
assumption makes the Choice model stipulative rather than gen-
uinely explanatory of a range of cases (3, 4). This is a pity since both
the choice model and the Liberal view to which it gives rise have
insightful things to say about addiction and the role of pleasure in
establishing and maintaining it.
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